Summary of Discussion Paper 59 (Continued)

2) Agency culture

'The Review received considerable evidence that the culture of an agency is a significant factor in the success or otherwise of FOI.' It has been recognised that not all agencies have an accepting and cooperative attitude towards FOI, and that in some, a negative culture exists. The Review suggests several factors that may give rise to such an approach

"Limited protection of s 91. Section 91 of the FOI Act provides that where a document is disclosed and access was required by the Act no action for defamation, breach of confidence or infringement of copyright can be taken against an officer. This effectively means that officers who disclose information pursuant to an FOI request where no exemption applies receive protection that officers who either exercise a discretion not to claim an available exemption or disclose information outside the Act do not receive. This has two consequences. First, it may discourage officers from disclosing information without treating the request as a formal FOI request.1 This would be contrary to the preferred approach of general openness without automatic resort to the FOI Act. Second, it encourages officers to claim available exemptions without considering whether they are absolutely necessary to prevent some harm in the particular situation. "

In view of the limited protection of s 91 the Review has proposed that the protection afforded by this section should be broadened.

The Review considers that a change in attitude from one of withholding information, unless forced by the FOI Act to disclose it, to one of disclosing information unless there is a very good reason not to will be most likely to occur if there is a rebuttable presumption that disclosure is appropriate. The release of information consistent with the spirit and terms of the FOI Act should be an authorised release of information. Section 91 should be amended to provide this. Officers should receive protection from defamation, breach of confidence and copyright actions whenever they disclose information, whether pursuant to the FOI Act or not, provided disclosure is not malicious or reckless. The Act should effectively provide 'authorisation to disclose' rather than protection from the consequences of disclosure.

3) An independent person to oversee the administration of the Act

The Review considered that a number of shortcomings evident in both the administration and compliance of the Act could be attributed to the fact that agency request handling is not systematically reviewed. At present a review is only carried out once an application for an appeal or review of a decision has been lodged. In effect, the Review considers that:

" 'the lack of an independent, constant monitor of agencies' administration of and compliance with the Act is a major cause of deficient and inefficient federal FOI administration. It contributes to FOI's low profile, both inside and outside government. It means it is virtually impossible to compare agencies' administration of FOI for the purpose of ascertaining, developing and promoting best practices. There is no incentive for agencies to give FOI the attention and priority it should receive to ensure its effective and efficient administration. It is unlikely that agencies that need to change their practices and attitudes will do so unless they know their performance is going to be evaluated, monitored and reported publicly. Some agencies have their own quality controls but there is no government-wide quality control apart from AAT appeals and Ombudsman complaints. Additional quality control measures are needed. A monitoring function, independent of existing review arrangements, would benefit individual agencies and the FOI system as a whole. It would increase public confidence and encourage agencies, where necessary, to improve request processing. The Review proposes, therefore, that an independent person be charged with responsibility for overseeing the administration of the FOI Act. This person should audit agencies, as the Privacy Commissioner does in respect of the Privacy Act. If deficient procedures are found, he or she should consult with and advise the agency on how to improve them. The monitor would develop a good understanding of each agency's different situation and the type of requests it receives. "

Integral to this monitoring role would be a number of functions. Such would include:

The Review considered that situations would arise in which the involvement of an independent person would be to the advantage of both parties.

These situations include where the applicant's request is very broad and the agency is unable or unwilling to persuade the applicant to narrow it or where the agency wishes to reject a request on the ground that it would require a substantial diversion of resources. An independent person may be able to suggest a way of processing the request that will reduce the workload (for example by reducing consultation). The Review sees merit in establishing a mechanism for an independent person to mediate between the parties to a request if asked to do so by either party and proposes that whoever is given responsibility for monitoring the Act should perform this role. . . The facilitation envisaged by the Review would be informal and non-binding.2

Issues outlined by the Review with respect to the breadth of the role that the independent monitor should play include:

Further, the Review called for suggestions as to whether the independent monitor should have a role to play after in respect of individual requests after a decision has been made by the agency.

It is perceived by the Review that in addition to the above functions mentioned, that the independent monitor could also promote the FOI Act, provide guidelines on how to administer the Act, assist with the education and training of agencies, and provide legislative policy advice on access to government information.

After reviewing a number of options as to who would perform the role of independent monitor (ie incorporating the role into an existing body, such as a parliamentary committee, the Ombudsman, Australian Archives , AAT or Privacy Commissioner) the Review forms the conclusion that the most viable alternative would be to create a new separate statutory office.

Using the FOI Act (Chapter 4)

This chapter considers the issues relating to the way the FOI Act operates in practice including what is available under the Act, making requests, processing requests and information management. The primary recommendations made by the Review are as follows:

Exemptions- General Principles (Chapter 5)

The main issues in this chapter centre around problems with the current exemption provisions. The solutions proposed by the Review include:

Specific Exemptions (Chapter 6)

This chapter examines the specific exemptions in the FOI Act and considers whether the interests they are designed to protect warrant protecting and if, they do, whether they reflect the philosophy described in Chapter 5. The wording of the sections and tests used in them are also discussed. The following recommendations were made:

The cost of seeking access to information under the FOI Act (Chapter 7)

This chapter examines the rationale for the current fees and charges regime in a scheme designed to enhance openness, accountability and public participation in government and in which the aim should be to provide information in the most efficient, cost effective way. In summary, the Review considers that some form of contribution is appropriate, but that the cost of providing info should be reduced. The Review made the following recommendations:

Amendment of Personal Information (Chapter 8)

The following recommendations were made:


1. See Privacy Commissioner Submission 81.

2. The independent monitor could, however, prepare a written report on the outcome of the mediation. This record could then be taken into consideration by the AAT if the agency's decision was appealed and the AAT wished to see it.


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